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the power to appeal as prosecutorial, the Fourth Circuit looked to the
nature of the right to appeal. Because of the double jeopardy bar to
postacquittal appeals, the Fourth Circuit found that the ability to file an
interlocutory appeal is an important prosecutorial tool. As the prosecutor,
the independent counsel must be able to decide whether or not to use this
device. The independent counsel's decision will depend upon whether the
appeal will aid in prosecuting the defendant. If the Attorney General also
has the right to file interlocutory appeals, the Attorney General is capable
of directly controlling the prosecution, thus depriving the independent
counsel of the independence granted by statute. Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the right to file an interlocutory appeal is a prosecutorial function, and that only the independent counsel should have the
right to appeal.
Acknowledging that a primary function of the Attorney General is to
protect national security, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Act and CIPA
in such a way that national security is uncompromised and full force is
given to the Act and the CIPA. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
independent counsel, as well as the Attorney General, can protect national
security under section 7(a) because both officers perform the same prosecutorial functions under section 7(a). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
reserved to the Attorney General the exclusive right to file an affidavit
objecting to disclosure of the classified information under section 6(e) of
the CIPA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit succeeded in protecting the prosecutorial independence of the independent counsel while reserving to the
Attorney General the ultimate power to protect national security interests.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Appeal of U.S. by Atty. Gen. is in
agreement with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
2
Columbia position regarding the independent counsel's right to appeal.1
Both circuits have held that the independent counsel should have the sole
right to appeal under the CIPA. The Ninth Circuit has expanded the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of "notwithstanding any other provision of law,"
by stating that this phrase means that not only statutes but also common
law doctrines may not limit an act bearing this phrase.83 Appeal of U.S.
by Atty. Gen. limits the Attorney General's role in such cases to the filing
of an affidavit prohibiting disclosure of the classified information. The
Attorney General may not file appeals. Therefore, Appeal of U.S. by Atty.
Gen. increases the independent counsel's control over the prosecution of
high-ranking executive officers while preserving the Attorney General's
power to protect national security interests.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) provides a scheme for imposing liability for
82. U.S. v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441 (D.D.C. 1989) (stating that only independent
counsel can appeal in prosecution governed by Ethics in Government Act).
83. See In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Ala. 1990) (questioning Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of "notwithstanding any other provision of law").
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the cleanup of hazardous substances on those parties responsible for the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 4 Potentially responsible parties include past and present owners of the facility from which the
hazardous substances were released or are threatening release, transporters
of hazardous substances who disposed of hazardous substances at the
facility, and any person who generated hazardous substances and arranged
for disposal of the substances at the facility. 5 Any cleanup response to the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances must conform with
the national contingency plan.8 6 In Richland-Lexington Airport District v.
Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the effect of private
parties not obtaining government approval before affecting a cleanup of
hazardous substances. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit considered the impact
of a contractual relationship between the parties undertaking the cleanup
of hazardous substances and the generator of the hazardous substances.
In Richland the plaintiff, Richland-Lexington Airport District (Airport),
allowed the defendant, Atlas Properties, Inc., doing business as Carolina
Chemicals (Carolina), to dump emptied agricultural chemical containers in
a private dump that Airport operated. Airport charged Carolina twenty-five
dollars per month to use the dump to dispose of the containers. Carolina
stopped dumping the chemical containers at Airport's dump in 1962, Over
the next several years, the containers deteriorated, leaching hazardous substances into the soil and groundwater. In 1981, the South Carolina Department
of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) cited Carolina and
Airport for discharging hazardous wastes into the environment without a
permit. After several meetings, the Department informed Airport that
Airport would have to remove the source of the pollution. Airport undertook
the cleanup and then sued Carolina under CERCLA and various state law
theories. Airport won a jury verdict, but the district court granted Carolina's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that
Airport did not have the requisite governmental approval of the cleanup,
and that the contractual relationship between Airport and Carolina barred
recovery.

Airport appealed, arguing first that CERCLA did not require government approval of private cleanup actions before the prosecution of a suit
for cost recovery. Initially, the Fourth Circuit noted that some courts have
found a requirement of prior government approval in CERCLA's requirement that any remedial action must be in accordance with the national
contingency plan (NCP). The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) amended the NCP in 1985 to make clear
that government approval of a private response action is not required for
the party undertaking the response to recover costs from potentially re84. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4) (1988) (detailing those parties potentially responsible
for hazardous substance cleanup).
85. Id.

86. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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sponsible parties. The Fourth Circuit followed Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1986), in giving deference to
the EPA's interpretation of the NCP. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
held that governmental approval was not a prerequisite to private recovery
under CERCLA.
The Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether a contractual
relationship between Airport and Carolina prevented a suit under CERCLA.
The Fourth Circuit examined the language of CERCLA section 107 (a)(3),
which states that "any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise
arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances" is liable to any other
person for cleanup costs incurred in accordance with the NCP. From this
language, the Fourth Circuit found that CERCLA expressly provides for
recovery among contracting parties. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, vacated
the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for reinstatement
of the jury verdict and entry of a judgment in favor of Airport. The
Richland decision brings the Fourth Circuit in accord with the Ninth
Circuit."'
Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act (the Act), 33 U.S.C. section
1311(a) (1982), outlaws the discharge of pollutants into United States
navigable waters except as provided for in other relevant sections of the
Act. Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1342, establishes the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), under which the Environmental Protection Agency may issue permits allowing a holder to discharge certain pollutants at specified levels. Section 505 of the Act (Section
505), 33 U.S.C. section 1365, allows United States citizens to bring a civil
action against any person or entity alleged to be in violation of, inter alia,
a NPDES permit limitation.88 Under section 505(a), a federal district court
entertaining such a citizen suit may assess civil penalties against a polluter
as mandated by section 309(d) of the Act (Section 309(d)), 33 U.S.C. section
1319(d).8 9 In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (Gwaltney 111), the United States Supreme Court
held that section 505(a) does not confer courts with jurisdiction over citizen
suits concerning violations that occurred entirely in the past. However, the
87. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-91 (9th Cir. 1986)
(allowing private suit for cost recovery without prior government approval).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). Section 505(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf ... against any person ... who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation.... The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation ... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section

1319(d) of this title.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). Section 309(d) provides:
Any person who violates [listed sections] of this title, or any permit condition or
limitation implementing any of such sections ... shall be subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.

1991]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Supreme Court also ruled that a plaintiff's good faith allegation of present
ongoing violations is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir.
1989) (Gwaltney V1), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered the circumstances under which NPDES permit violations
constitute ongoing violations. The Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney VI also
considered whether a court simultaneously may have jurisdiction over some
specific NPDES permit limitation violations while lacking jurisdiction over
other specific NPDES permit limitation violations. Finally, the court considered whether the cessation of violations before trial renders a section 505
action moot and whether citizen-plaintiffs have standing to sue under section
505 when the only remedy available is a penalty paid to the United States
Treasury.
In Gwaltney VI the defendant, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. (Gwaltney),
had purchased a meat processing plant in October 1981. At the time of the
purchase, the plant was in violation of Gwaltney's NPDES permit total
Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) and NPDES permit chlorine limitations. Gwaltney's
chlorine violations continued until October 1982, at which time the violations
ceased. In addition, after purchasing the plant, Gwaltney implemented a
plan to modify its wastewater treatment facility to properly treat waste from
the plant and thereby put an end to the company's TKN violations. Although
the changes were completed in October 1983, Gwaltney continued to violate
its NPDES permit TKN limitation through the winter of 1983-84. Gwaltney's
last TKN violation occurred on May 15, 1984, three months after the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. (CBF) had sent to Gwaltney a notice of
intention to sue and one month before CBF sued Gwaltney.
On June 15, 1984, CBF, among others, sued Gwaltney in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the citizen
suit provisions of section 505. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) (Gwaltney 1), the
district court found Gwaltney liable for both the TKN and chlorine violations
and levied against Gwaltney a civil penalty of $1,285,322. The total penalty
included fines of $289,822 for violations of Gwaltney's TKN limit and fines
of $995,500 for violations of Gwaltney's chlorine limit. Gwaltney appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, contending
that, because the ongoing permit violations had ceased by the time CBF
brought suit, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
section 505(a). In support of this contention, Gwaltney cited language in
section 505(a) stating that citizens only may sue a person or entity alleged
to be in violation of the NPDES permit held by that person or entity. In
Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d
304, 308 (4th Cir. 1986) (Gwaltney I1), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. The Gwaltney II court interpreted section 505(a)
also to confer jurisdiction over suits based completely upon past violations.
To resolve differences in interpretation of section 505(a)'s jurisdictional
mandate among several Federal Courts of Appeals, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. In Gwaltney III, the Supreme Court held

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:725

that section 505 only confers jurisdiction over those cases in which the
defendants' violations are presently ongoing, or in which the plaintiff makes
a good faith allegation that violations are ongoing at the time the suit is
filed.
On remand in Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988) (Gwaltney IV), the Fourth Circuit
found that the district court's original alternative holding in Gwaltney 1,
that CBF had made its allegation of continuing violations in good faith,
was not clearly erroneous. The Fourth Circuit then remanded to the district
court for further findings on whether CBF had proved actual ongoing
violations at trial. Finding that CBF had proved ongoing NPDES permit
violations by Gwaltney at trial, the district court reinstated the original
$1,285,322 total civil penalty judgment against Gwaltney in Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (Gwaltney V).
Gwaltney then appealed to the Fourth Circuit again, contending that
the evidence was insufficient to uphold the district court's finding that the
violations actually were ongoing. Gwaltney also claimed that the district
court had erred in reinstating the penalty for the chlorine violations.
Gwaltney reasoned that CBF could not have made the allegations regarding
the chlorine violations in good faith, because the violations had ceased
twenty months before CBF first brought suit. Gwaltney also claimed that
CBF lacked standing and that the controversy was moot.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue of whether CBF had proved
the existence of ongoing violations. In its Gwaltney III opinion, the Supreme
Court had defined the term "ongoing violation" for purposes of section
505 as the existence of a reasonable probability that a person who had
polluted in the past would continue to pollute in the future. In Gwaltney
IV the Fourth Circuit had described two ways in which a plaintiff could
prove an ongoing violation: first, by proving that violations continued on
or beyond the date that the complaint was filed; or second, by presenting
evidence allowing a factfinder reasonably to conclude that a continuing
probability of recurrence of the violations existed. Gwaltney asserted that,
because the company had maintained a near-perfect record of compliance
with its NPDES permit since the month before CBF filed the complaint,
there was no ongoing violation at the time of the trial. However, the Fourth
Circuit, reiterating that CBF had proved that Gwaltney had committed TKN
violations between 1981 and 1984, defined the critical question as whether,
at the time the complaint was filed, a reasonable likelihood existed that
Gwaltney would continue to pollute in the future.
The Fourth Circuit found that, although Gwaltney had been in compliance with its NPDES permit during the summer of 1984, by the December
1984 trial date a reasonable likelihood existed that the impending cold
weather would cause Gwaltney once again to fail to comply with the permit's
TKN limitations. At the Gwaltney I trial, expert testimony offered by both
parties had established that low water temperatures are a major contributor
to TKN violations and, consequently, that during the winter months an
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increased likelihood exists that TKN violations will occur. Both expert
witnesses had expressed doubt whether, at the time of trial, Gwaltney's
lagoons possessed sufficient grease cover to insulate against normal winter
temperatures. Additionally, the experts had identified several other factors
possibly indicating that further TKN violations were possible, including
problems with laboratory procedures and the unknown effect of storm water
on the treatment system. Considering all facts known at the time of trial,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find that,
at that time, a continuing likelihood of recurring violations existed. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that violations
were ongoing at the time of trial.
Turning next to the issue of CBF's standing to sue, the Fourth Circuit
noted the requirements for Article III standing that the Supreme Court had
set forth in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Under the Allen
standing requirements, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged
in unlawful conduct that led to personal injury to the plaintiff. In addition,
the relief requested by the plaintiff must be capable of redressing the
plaintiff's alleged injury. Gwaltney argued that, because Gwaltney's permit
violations had already ceased at the time CBF filed its complaint, no
injunction was possible. Thus, Gwaltney pointed out, the only available
remedy was civil penalties against Gwaltney. Gwaltney further argued that,
because civil penalties under sections 309(d) and 505(a) are paid to the
United States Treasury, the monies paid would not redress any injury done
to CBF. The Fourth Circuit explained that, in Sierra Club v. Simkins
Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3185 (1989), the Fourth Circuit had already decided that civil penalties
payable to the United States Treasury do redress citizen-plaintiffs' injuries
sustained as a result of polluters' NPDES permit limitations violations. The
court pointed out that penalties paid to the Treasury can deter future
violations and that, if the plaintiff has proved actual or threatened injury
arising from the alleged wrong and a specific interest in deterring NPDES
violations, then the civil penalties are causally related to the injury. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that CBF had standing to sue Gwaltney
under section 505.
Gwaltney further claimed that because the TKN violations had ceased
in May 1984 and had not recurred since, any action based on a claim of
ongoing violations was moot. The Fourth Circuit first looked to its own
summary of the Supreme Court's mootness doctrine, as set forth in Cedar
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978). In Cedar Coal the Fourth Circuit explained
that courts are empowered to decide only concrete controversies capable of
resolution through a specific and conclusive decree of relief and actually
involving the legal relations of parties with opposing legal interests. The
Fourth Circuit noted that courts may not render opinions based upon
hypothetical statements of facts. The court then considered whether, in light
of the fact that subject matter jurisdiction is based on allegations of present
continuing violations, section 505 litigation regarding penalties levied solely

